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Abstract  
Dawes (2013) claims that we ought not to believe but to accept our best scientific theories. To 
accept them means to employ them as premises in our reasoning with the goal of attaining 
knowledge about unobservables. I reply that if we do not believe our best scientific theories, 
we cannot gain knowledge about unobservables, our opponents might dismiss the predictions 
derived from them, and we cannot use them to explain phenomena. We commit an unethical 
speech act when we explain a phenomenon in terms of a theory we do not believe.  
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1. Introduction  
We use a rule of inference called inference to the best explanation (‘IBE’ from now on) in our 
daily life and in our scientific practice. Darwin, for instance, argued that evolutionary theory 
is better than creationism because some biological phenomena can be explained in terms of 
evolutionary theory but not in terms of creationism: 
 
And we can clearly understand these analogies, if species have once existed as varieties, and 
have thus originated: whereas, these analogies are utterly inexplicable if each species has been 
independently created. (Darwin 1859/1993: 146) 
 
Can we believe that a theory is true on the grounds that it is better than its competitor? 
Scientific realists and nonrealists diverge on the answers to this question. Realists say that the 
best of the conceived rival theories is (approximately) true, constructive empiricists say that it 
is empirically adequate, and instrumentalists say that it is the most useful instrument for 
generating predictions and explanations. 
Gregory Dawes (2013) stakes out an original position that differs from scientific 
realism, constructive empiricism, and instrumentalism. He claims that we ought to accept as 
opposed to believe our best scientific theories. I will explicate Dawes’s account of what it is 
to accept a theory, and then argue that we ought to believe rather than accept our best 
scientific theories. The disadvantages of merely accepting them is that we cannot gain 
knowledge about unobservables, that our opponents might dismiss the predictions derived 
from them, and that we cannot use them to explain puzzling phenomena around us. It will 
become clear that we violate the ethics of speech act when we explain phenomena in terms of 
a theory we do not believe.  
 
2. Dawes’s Position 
Dawes rejects the realist suggestion that the best of the conceived rival theories is true on the 
grounds that truth may lie not in the range of conceived rival theories but in the range of 
unconceived rival theories, and that the criteria for making a comparative judgment of 
conceived rival theories are not truth-indicative: 
 
Firstly, the true explanation may be one we have not yet discovered. Secondly, at least some of 
the criteria by which we judge an explanation to be the best available (such as simplicity) are not 
clearly truth-indicative. (Dawes 2013: 64) 
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As van Fraassen puts it, the best available explanation “may be the best of a bad lot” (1989: 
143). What follows from the possibility that our best scientific theories may be the best of a 
bad lot? Suppose that T1 is better than T2, i.e., T1 is simpler than T2, T1 explains more than T2, 
T1 fits background theories better than T2, and so forth. These virtues of T1 indicate that T1 is 
closer to the truth than T2, but they do not indicate that T1 is close to the truth. It is one thing 
that T1 is closer to the truth than T2; it is quite another that T1 is close to the truth.  
Let me use an analogy to illuminate Dawes’s point. Suppose that John and Jane are 
located in the same place in London, and that John takes a few steps toward Paris. In such a 
situation, John is closer to Paris than Jane. It does not follow, however, that he is close to 
Paris or in Paris. He is in fact far from Paris. Analogously, T1 might be far from the truth even 
though it is closer to the truth than T2. Thus, IBE is a dubious rule of inference. We ought not 
to believe that T1 is (approximately) true. 
Should we abandon IBE altogether? Dawes answers no, claiming that we ought to 
accept the best available explanation. To accept a proposition is in contrast with to believe a 
proposition. To believe a proposition “is to consider it to be true” (Dawes 2013: 65). To 
accept a proposition is to use it as a premise to draw a conclusion with the goal of attaining 
knowledge:  
 
So, on my view, to accept a proposition is to employ it as a premise in one’s reasoning, whether 
theoretical or practical, in any domain to which it might apply, with the goal of attaining 
knowledge. (Dawes 2013: 68)  
 
For example, we ought to accept Newton’s theory of motion, which means that we ought to 
use it as a premise to support predictions with the goal of attaining knowledge about the 
motions of objects. To accept the theory does not involve the belief that it is true. Thus, even 
if you accept Newton’s theory of motion in Dawes’s sense, you may not believe that 
gravitational force is real. 
Dawes does not claim that we are warranted in accepting the best available explanation. 
He rather claims that we ought to accept the best available explanation. Why ought we to 
accept it?  
 
..if we are committed to the extension of our knowledge, then we ought to accept the best 
available explanation of whatever puzzling fact it is we are attempting to explain (Dawes 2013: 
75). 
 
To use Dawes’s analogy (2013: 77), if our aim is to reach the summit of a mountain, we 
ought to choose the best route to the summit. Analogously, if our goal is to extend knowledge, 
accepting the best available explanation is “the best means of attaining that goal” (Dawes 
2013: 75). Of course, if we abandon the aim of reaching the summit, we need not choose the 
best route to it. Similarly, if we forgo the goal of extending knowledge, we need not accept 
the best available explanation. 
By knowledge does Dawes mean knowledge about observables or knowledge about 
unobservables? So far as I can tell, he means knowledge about unobservables. After all, he 
claims that “scientific theories aim at truth, whether or not we have any reason to believe they 
have achieved their aim” (Dawes 2013: 68 footnote). Realists would concur with him that 
science aims at knowledge about unobservables. 
Dawes (2013: 67) cites Cohen’s analogy of a lawyer (1989: 369) to illustrate his view 
that to accept a theory involves the commitment to use it as a premise in our reasoning. A 
lawyer may be utterly convinced that his client is guilty, but he ought to accept the innocence 
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of his client, acting in court as if his client is innocent, as long as he has the goal of serving as 
his client’s legal representative. Once the trial is over, however, the lawyer may no longer 
accept the innocence of his client. Likewise, we ought to use a theory as a premise in our 
reasoning, as long as we have the goal of attaining knowledge. We may no longer accept the 
theory, once we give up the goal of extending knowledge.  
In a certain respect, Dawes’s position is similar to instrumentalism. Both agree that 
only observational claims of science are believable. They have, however, different views on 
the cognitive status of a scientific theory. Instrumentalism asserts that a scientific theory is 
merely an instrument for organizing thoughts about observables. A scientific theory does not 
represent the world, so it is neither true nor false. It is only useful or useless, depending on 
whether it yields true or false predictions. Dawes, on the other hand, denies that a scientific 
theory is merely an instrument for predictions: 
 
It follows that my view of scientific theories is not ‘instrumental’ in the traditional sense. It does 
not regard a scientific theory as comparable to a tool, such as a hammer, which in no sense 
‘represents’ the things it produces. (Dawes 2013: 77) 
 
On Dawes’s account, a scientific theory is true or false. We only do not have sufficient 
evidence to believe that it is true. In this sense, Dawes’s position is similar to constructive 
empiricism.  
Both Dawes’s position and constructive empiricism agree that a scientific theory has a 
truth-value, and that only observational claims of science are trustworthy. They disagree, 
however, about what science aims at and about what acceptance amounts to. Constructive 
empiricism claims that science aims at empirically adequate theories, and that to accept a 
theory involves the belief that it is empirically adequate:  
 
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory 
involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. (van Fraassen 1980: 12) 
 
For Dawes, on the other hand, science aims at knowledge about unobservables and to accept 
a theory does not involve the belief that it is empirically adequate. After all, he says that we 
ought to accept a theory even if it “has at least one indisputably false observational 
consequence” (Dawes 2013: 70). In other words, we ought to accept a theory even if it is 
empirically inadequate. For example, Newton’s theory of motion makes false predictions 
about the motions of objects approaching the speed of light. Even so, we ought to accept 
Newton’s theory of motion. In contrast, van Fraassen would say that we ought not to accept 
Newton’s theory of motion because it is empirically inadequate.  
Dawes’s position is similar to realism in a certain respect. Both agree that science aims 
at knowledge about unobservables. They diverge, however, on the issue of whether our best 
scientific theories are trustworthy or not. Realism says that they are trustworthy, whereas 
Dawes’s position says that they are not. Dawes’s position is predicated on the observation 
that they are the products of the dubious rule of inference, IBE. They might be far from truths, 
although they are better than their rivals. Therefore, Dawes’s position is distinct from realism.  
Dawes presents another reason for accepting our best scientific theories. He observes 
that the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are mutually inconsistent, and 
that “it is difficult to make sense of the idea that scientists could believe inconsistent theories” 
(Dawes, 2013: 72). Based on this observation, he rejects Musgrave’s realist contention (2009) 
that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories, including the general theory of 
relativity and quantum mechanics. 
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3. Inconsistency 
In this section, I make two critical comments against Dawes’s argument that since the general 
theory of relativity is inconsistent with quantum mechanics, we ought to accept our best 
scientific theories. First, the incompatibility of the two fundamental theories does not make it 
impossible that other scientific theories, such as evolutionary theory and the theory of plate 
tectonics, are approximately true. The approximate truth of those other theories are 
independent of whether quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity are 
compatible or incompatible. Thus, the inconsistency between the two fundamental physical 
theories does not necessarily lead to Dawes’s position that we ought to accept rather than 
believe the other scientific theories. 
Second, the inconsistency between quantum mechanics and the general theory of 
relativity does not preclude the possibility that they are both approximately true, and the 
possibility that one is exactly true and the other is approximately true.
1
 Suppose that Bill 
Clinton is exactly 180cm. Consider the following four statements: 
 
(1) Bill Clinton is 181.1cm. 
(2) Bill Clinton is 179.9cm. 
 
(3) Bill Clinton is 180cm. 
(4) Bill Clinton is 179.9cm. 
 
(1) and (2) are mutually inconsistent. So are (3) and (4). Both (1) and (2) are, however, 
approximately true. (3) is completely true, and (4) is approximately true. These examples 
show that the mere inconsistency between the general theory of relativity and quantum 
mechanics does not mean that they are completely false. It is possible that both are 
approximately true, or that one is completely true and the other is approximately true. 
Therefore, the inconsistency between the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics 
does not necessarily lead to Dawes’s conclusion that we ought to accept our best scientific 
theories. There is an alternative position that we ought to believe that our best scientific 
theories are approximately true. 
 
4. Alternatives 
Let me make use of the internalism-externalism debate in the meta-ethics literature to 
propose an alternative to Dawes’s account of acceptance. Recall that, for Dawes, to accept a 
theory is to employ it as a premise in one’s reasoning with the goal of attaining knowledge. 
His sentence suggests that the acceptance of p has as its content the motivation to use p as a 
premise, i.e., the disposition to use p as a premise is internal to the acceptance of p. The 
disposition and the acceptance are not separate mental states. The disposition is an essential 
element of the acceptance. Put another way, if we accept a theory, we are necessarily 
motivated to use it as a premise in our reasoning. On the alternative account, the motivation 
to use p as a premise is not internal but external to the acceptance of p, i.e., they are separate 
mental states. Of course, when we accept p, we are often disposed to use it as a premise, but 
the disposition is a distinct mental state that happens to accompany the acceptance of p. On 
this alternative account, we can conceive of the situation in which we accept p without being 
motivated to use p as a premise. 
The advent of the rival theory of acceptance poses some difficulties to Dawes. First, in 
order to believe that his theory of acceptance is true, he ought to show that his theory of 
                                                          
1
 The literature on the notion of approximate truth is vast. For a comprehensive survey on the literature, see 
Oddie (2014). 
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acceptance is better than the rival theory of acceptance. It is not clear, however, that his 
theory of acceptance is simpler, explains more, and meshes better with background theories 
than the rival theory of acceptance. Second, even if his theory of acceptance is better than the 
rival theory of acceptance, it does not follow that his theory of acceptance is true because his 
theory of acceptance may be the best of a bad lot. In order to believe that his theory of 
acceptance is true, he ought to show that truth is more likely to be found in the range of 
conceived rival theories of acceptance than in the range of unconceived rival theories of 
acceptance. In short, Dawes’s reasons for not believing our best scientific theories backfire on 
his own theory of acceptance.  
Refuting my foregoing criticisms against Dawes’s account of acceptance requires 
pinpointing a problem with them rather than merely claiming that the philosophical account 
of acceptance and the scientific explanation of phenomena should be judged by different 
standards. After all, it is not clear why the (possible) existence of unconceived rival theories 
poses a problem to the scientific explanation of phenomena, but not to the philosophical 
account of acceptance. Do philosophers have the magical method to dispel unconceived rival 
theories unlike scientists? Furthermore, the attempt to defend the philosophical account of 
acceptance by advancing its difference from the scientific explanation of phenomena would 
not sound plausible to philosophers who go along with naturalism (Quine 1969) that there is 
no fundamental difference between science and philosophy. 
 
5. Goal  
Dawes contends that the goal of accepting the best available explanation is to gain knowledge 
about unobservables. In my view, however, we can never achieve that goal, if Dawes is right 
that virtues such as simplicity, explanatory power, and coherence with background theories 
are not indicative of truth, and that they can only get us closer to the truth. As noted earlier, 
there is a huge difference between being closer and being close to truth. One may wonder 
why we ought to set such an unachievable goal. 
Dawes might reply that if John constantly takes steps toward Paris, and if enough time 
passes, he will be close to Paris or will be in Paris. Analogously, if new scientific theories 
continuously replace old scientific theories, and if enough time passes, we will be close to 
truths or will arrive at truths about unobservables. Thus, the goal which Dawes has set is an 
achievable one.  
     Let me point out, however, that no matter how many times new theories supersede old 
theories, we can never obtain knowledge about unobservables if we follow Dawes’s 
recommendation that we ought to accept as opposed to believe our best scientific theories. 
After all, belief is an essential ingredient of knowledge. In order to know that p, we ought to 
believe that p. If we merely accept p, we can never know that p, even if p is true, and even if 
we have sufficient evidence for p. Therefore, we will never be able to gain knowledge about 
unobservables if we merely accept our best scientific theories. Such knowledge is beyond our 
reach, even if our best scientific theories are true, and no matter how highly they are 
confirmed.  
Dawes claims that we ought to accept the best available explanation because accepting 
it is the best means to achieve the goal of attaining knowledge about unobservables: 
 
And the reasons why we should accept the best available explanation are pragmatic: they have 
to do with adopting the best available means to an end. (Dawes 2013: 75) 
 
In my view, however, to believe our best scientific theories is a better means of attaining 
knowledge about unobservables than to accept them. Suppose, for example, that the special 
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theory of relativity is true, and that we have adequate reason for believing it. Under such 
conditions, we know that the speed of light is invariant across different frames of reference, if 
we believe, but not if we merely accept, the special theory of relativity. 
 
6. Premise 
6.1. Prediction 
Dawes contends that we ought not to believe but accept our best scientific theories. His 
position implies that we ought to employ our best scientific theories as premises in our 
reasoning without believing them. In my view, however, if we do not believe them, they are 
powerless as premises, i.e., our audience would not take the conclusions derived from them 
seriously. No one believed, for instance, that light bends near the sun until Einstein proposed 
the general theory of relativity. Imagine that Einstein offers the following argument for the 
first time in history:  
 
Spacetime is curved near a massive object. 
Light travels along the curvature of spacetime near the sun. 
∴The relative positions of stars change when observed during the solar eclipse. 
 
Note that Einstein uses the general theory of relativity as a premise to derive the prediction. 
His critics ask him a perverse question: “Do you believe spacetime is curved near a massive 
object?” If he says yes, they would take his conclusion seriously and take pains to ascertain 
whether it agrees with the world or not. If he says no, however, they would respond, “If you 
don’t believe your premise, why should we take your conclusion seriously?” Accordingly, 
they would reject Einstein’s entire argument, and they would not bother to ascertain whether 
his prediction is true or false. To generalize, our opponents might dismiss the predictions of 
our best scientific theories simply on the grounds that we do not believe our best scientific 
theories. Should this happen, our best scientific theories perform the function of generating 
predictions but not the function of making the predictions persuasive, i.e., we can derive 
predictions from them, but we cannot use them to convince our audience that the predictions 
are true. 
     Even if we do not believe our best scientific theories, however, our opponents would 
believe the predictions of our best scientific theories, provided they have convincing 
independent premises for the predictions. Suppose, for example, that the general theory of 
relativity has the past record of making true predictions. In such a case, our critics would 
believe a prediction of the general theory of relativity that is not yet ascertained, even if we 
do not believe the general theory of relativity. They would believe the prediction not because 
the general theory of relativity serves as a premise for it but because the past record of the 
general theory of relativity serves as a convincing independent premise for it. In the absence 
of the independent premise, they would dismiss it on the grounds that we do not believe the 
general theory of relativity.  
Let me provide a slightly different example to illustrate the point that even if we do not 
believe our best scientific theories, our opponents would believe our conclusions, provided 
they have convincing independent premises for our conclusions. Imagine that Newton offers 
the following argument to his critics:  
 
F=Gm1m2/r
2
. 
A stone is thrown upward. 
∴It will fall down. 
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Newton’s critics ask, “Do you believe the law of gravity”? Even if Newton answers that he 
does not, they would believe his conclusion that the stone will fall down because they 
observed in the past that stones fell down. Their previous experiences serve as a convincing 
independent premise for his conclusion. In the absence of the independent premise, they 
would dismiss his prediction, asking him a similar blunt question: “Why should we believe 
your premise and conclusion when you don’t believe your premise?” Therefore, this example 
does not refute my criticism against Dawes’s position that if we do not believe our best 
scientific theories, they are impotent as premises, i.e., they do not have the power to make the 
predictions derived from them persuasive. 
 
6.2. Explanation 
Dawes claims that we ought not to believe but to accept our best scientific theories. In my 
view, however, if we do not believe them, we cannot use them as explanantia (the plural form 
of ‘explanans’) to explain puzzling phenomena around us, and we commit unethical speech 
acts if we explain phenomena in terms of our best scientific theories without believing them. 
In this section, I offer a few examples to establish the thesis that an adequate explanation 
requires that an explainer should believe an explanans. 
Let me begin with the example of near death experience (NDE). Many people claim 
that they have been to the world of the dead, telling a similar story that they went through a 
long tunnel, saw the bright light at the end of the tunnel, experienced euphoria when they 
faced the bright light, and saw their family members and friends who previously died. 
Neuroscience tells us, however, that when people have an NDE, a large amount of endorphin 
is released in their brain. A neuroscientist gives the following explanation of why John has an 
NDE: 
 
We have an NDE, whenever a large amount of endorphin is released in our brain. 
A large amount of endorphin is released in John’s brain. 
∴John has an NDE. 
 
Note that the first premise is a psychophysical law. Can the neuroscientist explain John’s 
NDE in terms of the psychophysical law without believing it? The answer is no because in 
order to explain John’s NDE, the neuroscientist should utter the psychophysical law, the first 
premise. By uttering it, he expresses his belief of the psychophysical law. If his critics ask 
him whether he believes the law or not, he cannot answer in the negative because if he does, 
they will be puzzled, and they will ask him embarrassing questions: “If you don’t believe the 
psychophysical law, how can you utter it? If you don’t believe it, why should we believe it?” 
     Dawes would reply that a scientist can use a scientific theory to explain phenomena 
without believing it, just as a lawyer can use the assumption that his client is innocent to 
explain the evidence presented in court without believing the assumption. Suppose, for 
example, that a lung cancer patient sued a tobacco company for having caused lung cancer in 
him. The tobacco company hired a lawyer. The lawyer is skeptical that the tobacco company 
is innocent, but he accepts the innocence of the tobacco company, so he says in court, “The 
plaintiff has lung cancer not because he smoked but because he was exposed to radon for a 
long time.” Similarly, a physicist is skeptical about von Neumann and Dirac’s version of 
quantum mechanics, but he accepts the version, so he explains an experimental outcome in 
terms of the version. He says, for example, “The interference pattern occurs in the double-slit 
experiment because an electron goes through two slits at the same time with equal chances.” 
Both the lawyer and the physicist explain explananda in terms of explanantia they do not 
believe. 
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In my view, there is something wrong with the lawyer’s speech act and the physicist’s 
speech act. Their speech acts do not match up with their beliefs. The lawyer does not believe 
that the tobacco company is innocent, but he speaks as if he believes that the tobacco 
company is innocent. Recall that he speaks as follows: 
 
Lawyer: “The plaintiff has lung cancer not because he smoked but because he was 
exposed to radon for a long time.” 
 
The lawyer cannot utter this sentence without the intention to deceive his explainees. His 
jurors and judges may come to believe that the tobacco company is innocent as a result of 
being exposed to the lawyer’s explanation of the lung cancer. Similarly, the physicist does not 
believe von Neumann and Dirac’s version of quantum mechanics, but he speaks as if he 
believes it. Recall that he speaks as follows: 
 
Physicist: “The interference pattern occurs in the double-slit experiment because an  
electron goes through two slits at the same time with equal chances.” 
 
The physicist cannot utter this sentence either without the intention to deceive his explainees. 
His explainees may come to believe von Neumann and Dirac’s version of quantum 
mechanics as a result of being exposed to the physicist’s explanation of the interference 
pattern. In short, the lawyer’s speech act and the physicist’s speech act are misleading to their 
explainees. As a result, the explainees may come to believe what the explainers do not 
believe. 
Relatedly, suppose that you are a member of a cult. Your cult leader talks as if he has 
special epistemic access to a god. He says, for example, “Complex things exist in the world 
because my god created them to be complex.” You are persuaded of his explanation of the 
complex things, so you encourage your family members and friends into your cult community. 
You even donate all of your property to your cult leader. It turns out, however, that your cult 
leader does not believe that his god exists but accepts the statement that his god exists. You 
would feel that he is an insincere person, his speech acts were deceptive, and he should not 
have uttered the sentences like “Complex things exist in the world because my god created 
them to be complex.”  
Analogously, it involves unethical speech acts to use our best scientific theories to 
explain phenomena without believing them. For example, it is unethical for the physicist to 
utter sentences like “The interference pattern occurs in the double-slit experiment because an 
electron goes through two slits at the same time with equal chances,” if he does not believe 
von Neumann and Dirac’s version of quantum mechanics. After all, his explainees will feel 
that he is an insincere person, and that he deceived them, once they later discover the truth 
that he merely accepted the version. Therefore, if you aim to explain phenomena in terms of 
our best scientific theories, you ought to believe them. The other side of the coin is that if you 
do not believe them, you ought not to explain phenomena on their terms.  
All the foregoing examples of the neuroscientist, the lawyer, the physicist, and the cult 
leader indicate that when you explain phenomena in terms of a theory you are doubtful about, 
you are proliferating to your explainees the belief you do not have. If you tell them the truth 
that you do not have the belief, they will point out that your speech act does not match up 
with your doxastic state, and they will not believe your explanation on the ground that you do 
not. It is not clear how merely accepting our best scientific theories contributes to the 
epistemic goals of obtaining truths and avoiding falsities. This criticism applies not only to 
Dawes’s position but also to constructive empiricism and instrumentalism. 
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Dawes might insist that we can explain phenomena in terms of our best scientific 
theories without believing that they are true. For example, we can explain why the stone falls 
down without believing the law of gravity. After all, we can change the modes of speech from 
(A) to (B): 
 
(A) The stone falls down because the stone is thrown upwards, and because F=Gm1m2/r
2
. 
(B) The stone’s being thrown upward and the law of gravity jointly explain why the 
stone falls down. 
 
There is an important difference between (A) and (B). When we utter (A), we are expressing 
our belief that the law of gravity is true. We cannot say (A), if we do not believe the law of 
gravity. In contrast, when we utter (B), we are not necessarily expressing our belief that the 
law of gravity is true. We can say (B), even if we do not believe the law of gravity. Therefore, 
we can explain phenomena in terms of our best scientific theories we do not believe. We can 
merely accept our best scientific theories, and still use them to explain phenomena. Dawes’s 
position is coherent.  
     On close examination, however, (B) is not an explanation of why the stone falls down 
but a description of the explanation of why the stone falls down. When you say (B), you are 
not explaining the phenomenon yourself but describing the explanation of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, my previous point stands that you cannot explain phenomena in terms of a theory 
unless you believe it. Furthermore, when you say (B), your explainee may ask you an 
embarrassing question: Do you believe the law of gravity? You cannot say yes because you 
merely accept the law of gravity. But if you say no, your explainee may say, “If you don’t 
believe it, why should I believe it? Since I don’t believe it either, it is still puzzling to me why 
the stone falls down.” Thus, if you do not believe the law of gravity, we cannot relieve your 
explainee of the puzzle.  
Hempel’s deductive-nomological model of explanation (1966) holds that some 
scientific explanations can be reconstructed as a deductively valid argument, that one of the 
premises is a law of nature, and that the conclusion is an explanandum. Note that a law of 
nature serves as a premise for the explanandum. This part of the deductive-nomological 
model of explanation dovetails with Dawes’s suggestion that we ought to use our best 
scientific theories as premises in our reasoning. 
In my view, the deductive-nomological model of explanation captures the logical 
aspect of some scientific explanations, but it does not capture the doxastic aspect of scientific 
explanations, viz., you ought to believe an explanans to explain an explanandum on its terms. 
In other words, unless you believe an explanans, you cannot invoke it to explain an 
explanandum. Your explainees will accuse you of having the intention to deceive them, if 
they know that you explain an explanandum in terms of an explanans you do not believe. 
 
7. Conclusion 
For Dawes, to accept a proposition is to employ it as a premise in our reasoning with the goal 
of attaining knowledge about unobservables. To accept a proposition does not involve the 
belief that the proposition is true. We ought to accept rather than believe the best of conceived 
rivals because truth may lie in the set of unconceived rivals; because virtues such as 
simplicity, explanatory power, and coherence with background theories are not indicative of 
truth; and because the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are mutually 
inconsistent. Dawes also claims that accepting the best of conceived rivals is the best means 
to attain knowledge about unobservables.  
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I replied that the inconsistency between the general theory of relativity and quantum 
mechanics does not necessarily lead to Dawes’s position that we ought to accept our best 
scientific theories, including the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. It 
remains unscathed that they are approximately true. After proposing an alternative theory of 
acceptance to undercut Dawes’s account of acceptance, I argued that we ought to believe our 
best scientific theories to gain knowledge about unobservables, to prevent our best scientific 
theories from becoming powerless as premises, and to explain phenomena in terms of our 
best scientific theories. Finally, it goes against the ethics of speech act to explain phenomena 
in terms of our best scientific theories without believing them. 
In this paper, I did not fully address Dawes’s worry that truth may lie in the set of 
unconceived rivals. The same worry is raised by van Fraassen (1989: 143), Ladyman, 
Douven, Horsten, and van Fraassen (1997), Wray (2008; 2012), and Khalifa (2010). Their 
worry goes by the names ‘the argument from a bad lot’ and ‘the argument from 
underconsideration.’ The argument says that our best scientific theories may be the best of a 
bad lot, so realists ought to prove first that truth is more likely to exist in the set of conceived 
rivals than in the set of unconceived rivals, or that scientists have the epistemic privilege to 
generate true theories. To tackle this interesting argument goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
I can only make a quick criticism against it here. It backfires on antirealists’ positive 
philosophical theories, such as Dawes’s theory of acceptance, as demonstrated in Section 3.2 
of this paper. In other words, antirealists’ positive philosophical theories fall prey to it, if it is 
a strong argument. 
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